Extensions and failure thresholds for the affine-payoff extremality result
Determine whether the affine payoff remains extremal for the potential share on every regular conflict graph with continuous priorities, determine for which numbers of agents the affine-payoff extremality fails with two priority levels, and establish whether the finite-quantisation bound of Theorem 1 extends to orientations of conflict graphs containing directed cycles.
References
At finite $K$ the extremality of affine payoffs can fail off the complete graph and under randomised tie-breaking (Section~\ref{sec:beyond}); whether it holds on every regular graph for continuous priorities, for which $N$ it fails at $K=2$, and whether Theorem~\ref{thm:finiteK} extends to orientations with directed cycles remain open.
— Priority Coordination Games: Hodge Decomposition and a Sharp Design Limit
(2610.05832 - Lin et al., 5 Oct 2026) in Conclusion