SATversary: Adversarial Attacks on Satellite Fingerprinting (2506.06119v1)

Abstract: As satellite systems become increasingly vulnerable to physical layer attacks via SDRs, novel countermeasures are being developed to protect critical systems, particularly those lacking cryptographic protection, or those which cannot be upgraded to support modern cryptography. Among these is transmitter fingerprinting, which provides mechanisms by which communication can be authenticated by looking at characteristics of the transmitter, expressed as impairments on the signal. Previous works show that fingerprinting can be used to classify satellite transmitters, or authenticate them against SDR-equipped attackers under simple replay scenarios. In this paper we build upon this by looking at attacks directly targeting the fingerprinting system, with an attacker optimizing for maximum impact in jamming, spoofing, and dataset poisoning attacks, and demonstrate these attacks on the SatIQ system designed to authenticate Iridium transmitters. We show that an optimized jamming signal can cause a 50% error rate with attacker-to-victim ratios as low as -30dB (far less power than traditional jamming) and demonstrate successful identity forgery during spoofing attacks, with an attacker successfully removing their own transmitter's fingerprint from messages. We also present a data poisoning attack, enabling persistent message spoofing by altering the data used to authenticate incoming messages to include the fingerprint of the attacker's transmitter. Finally, we show that our model trained to optimize spoofing attacks can also be used to detect spoofing and replay attacks, even when it has never seen the attacker's transmitter before. Furthermore, this technique works even when the training dataset includes only a single transmitter, enabling fingerprinting to be used to protect small constellations and even individual satellites, providing additional protection where it is needed the most.

• The paper demonstrates that optimized jamming signals can achieve a 50% error rate at -30 dB power, exposing low-power denial of service risks.
• The paper reveals that spoofing attacks effectively remove transmitter fingerprints, resulting in false acceptance rates up to 31.4% with phase synchronization.
• The paper introduces strategies in dataset poisoning and GAN-based spoofing detection, advancing defenses in legacy satellite communication systems.

An Analysis of Adversarial Attacks on Satellite Fingerprinting Systems

The paper "SATversary: Adversarial Attacks on Satellite Fingerprinting" provides an in-depth examination of vulnerabilities in radio transmitter fingerprinting systems. Authored by researchers from the University of Oxford and armasuisse Science + Technology, the paper critiques and expands upon existing wireless fingerprinting approaches, focusing on threats faced by legacy satellite systems. It methodically explores the potential for targeted attacks on fingerprinting techniques used to authenticate satellite communications and presents novel strategies for both attacking and defending these systems.

Key Contributions

The paper presents several poignant findings regarding the security of satellite fingerprinting systems:

1. Optimized Jamming Signals: The authors demonstrate that optimized jamming signals can achieve a 50% error rate at substantially lower power levels (-30 dB) compared to traditional jamming techniques. This is notable as it indicates potential for denial of service with less detectable interference signals, challenging prior assertions regarding jamming efficacy.
2. Spoofing Attacks: A core component of the research involves identity spoofing, where attackers alter message fingerprints to falsify transmitter identities. The authors successfully remove their transmitter's fingerprint from an SDR-generated message, indicating that fingerprinting systems can be susceptible to spoofing attacks. They describe achieving false acceptance rates of up to 31.4% when phase synchronization is attainable, which underlines the impact of such attacks in practical scenarios.
3. Dataset Poisoning: Another contribution is a mechanism for poisoning fingerprinting datasets, wherein attackers gradually modify reference examples to include their transmitter fingerprints, leading to persistent message spoofing. This implies significant long-term vulnerability that could enable attackers to stealthily persist within a system.
4. Single-Transmitter Fingerprinting via GANs: The paper explores deploying GANs to mimic and then detect spoofing attacks, offering a distinctive approach to improve satellite fingerprinting systems electing to protect small constellations or single satellites. This enhances security without the need for training with extensive datasets across different transmitters, thus broadening the applicability of fingerprinting techniques.

Practical and Theoretical Implications

The insights provided by the paper hold practical implications, particularly in the field of satellite communications where systems are often outdated and physically challenging to upgrade. The vulnerabilities highlighted indicate an urgent need to enhance fingerprinting techniques or to integrate multifaceted signal intelligence for robust defenses.

On a theoretical level, the research invites exploration into more advanced countermeasures against jamming and spoofing, including integrating deeper generative adversarial networks and improved hardware configurations that may withstand adversarial perturbations. Moreover, by suggesting GAN-based models for spoofing detection, the paper advocates for a move towards adaptive learning systems that continuously evolve to counteract emerging threats.

Speculation on AI Developments

Looking ahead, this research suggests potential developments in AI's role in satellite communications security. A promising avenue involves leveraging robust, adversarially trained models capable of learning and responding to threat landscapes dynamically. Advances in AI-driven fingerprinting may also transition towards AI capabilities embedded into network operations, providing real-time threat detection and mitigation.

Conclusion

"SATversary" effectively underscores the resilience requirements of satellite communications against evolving adversarial threats. By elucidating novel attack methodologies and countermeasures, the paper prioritizes the need for continual innovation in cybersecurity and encourages a broader adoption of intelligent systems adept at comprehensively securing wireless communication infrastructures. The findings signify a pivotal step towards fortified satellite systems, prompting deeper evaluative studies and advancements that can safeguard global satellite dependencies.