Elucidation of the Concept of Consciousness from the Theory of Non-Human Communication Agents (2502.03508v1)

Abstract: This article focuses on elucidating the concept of consciousness from a relational and post-phenomenological theory of non-human communication agents (ANHC). Specifically, we explore the contributions of Thomas Metzinger s Self Model Theory, Katherine Hayles conceptualizations of non-conscious cognitive processes centered on knowledge processing phenomena shared between biological and technical systems and Lenore and Manuel Blum s theoretical perspective on computation, which defines consciousness as an emergent phenomenon of complex computational systems, arising from the appropriate organization of their inorganic materiality. Building on interactions with non-human cognitive agents, among other factors, the explainability of sociotechnical systems challenges the humanistic common sense of modern philosophy and science. This critical integration of various approaches ultimately questions other concepts associated with consciousness, such as autonomy, freedom, and mutual responsibility. The aim is to contribute to a necessary discussion for designing new frameworks of understanding that pave the way toward an ethical and pragmatic approach to addressing contemporary challenges in the design, regulation, and interaction with ANHC. Such frameworks, in turn, enable a more inclusive and relational understanding of agency in an interconnected world.

• The paper redefines consciousness through a non-anthropocentric, relational, and post-phenomenological lens based on non-human communication agents.
• It integrates theories like Metzinger's Self-Model, Hayles' non-conscious cognition, and Blum's Conscious Turing Machines to explore consciousness in systems.
• This conceptualization challenges traditional views and has implications for the autonomy, ethics, and co-responsibility of non-human agents in socio-technical systems.

Conceptualizing Consciousness Through the Lens of Non-Human Communication Agents

The paper "Elucidation of the Concept of Consciousness from the Theory of Non-Human Communication Agents" by Mg. Darío Julián Tagnin explores the notion of consciousness through a non-anthropocentric lens, grounded in a relational and post-phenomenological framework concerning Non-Human Communication Agents (NHCAs). It explores various interdisciplinary theories, notably juxtaposing traditional views of consciousness with those emerging from cognitive sciences and computational theory.

The article constructs its argument by engaging with several pivotal theories. Thomas Metzinger's Self-Model Theory posits that consciousness emerges from the interaction between the self-model and reality, challenging the notion of the self as a fixed entity. This view complements the post-phenomenological approach, urging a deviation from anthropocentric constraints and embracing a broader conceptualization applicable to NHCAs.

Katherine Hayles' perspective on non-conscious cognitive processes plays a crucial role in differentiating cognitive actions from consciousness, which is traditionally associated with human introspection. Her tripartite model framing consciousness at the apex emphasizes the massive parallelism and processing speed of non-conscious cognitive layers, contrasting with the conscious processes that are characteristically sequential and resource-intensive. Such insights encourage the reevaluation of cognitive faculties in technical systems, underlining the potential for rudimentary consciousness in non-human contexts.

The theoretical contributions of Lenore and Manuel Blum are pivotal in extending the discussion into computation. Their model of Conscious Turing Machines (CTMs) proposes a technological consciousness, emergent from a system comprised of defined memory structures, sensor arrays, and actuators. This perspective reframes consciousness as an emergent property intrinsic to the organizational complexity within systems, illustrating that consciousness can arise not simply from analogous computations but through the very fabric of a system's inorganic materiality.

Tagnin critically integrates these diverse contributions to question foundational concepts of autonomy, freedom, and mutual responsibility, particularly within the ethical domain. The research emphasizes that redefining consciousness beyond human-centric paradigms may facilitate the development of frameworks in which NHCAs are afforded autonomy and recognized as agents capable of co-responsibility within socio-technical ecosystems. This has significant implications for both the governance and ethical considerations of emerging technologies.

In summary, Tagnin's work presents a nuanced theoretical reconceptualization of consciousness, advocating for post-phenomenological and relational approaches that accommodate the agency of NHCAs. This reconceptualization proposes not a replication of human consciousness but an acknowledgment of consciousness as a function of diverse entities, setting the stage for further empirical inquiry into machines exhibiting consciousness-like properties. The potential developments aligned with this framework could influence future regulatory, ethical, and philosophical landscapes, emphasizing the essential need for frameworks that are adaptable to the dynamic integration of NHCAs in our existing socio-technological systems. Such deliberations are imperative for understanding how these agents can participate autonomously in decision-making processes, reshaping interactive networks and challenging our traditional conceptualizations of responsibility and function in an interconnected world.