Optimal Decoy Resource Allocation for Proactive Defense in Probabilistic Attack Graphs

Abstract: This paper investigates the problem of synthesizing proactive defense systems in which the defender can allocate deceptive targets and modify the cost of actions for the attacker who aims to compromise security assets in this system. We model the interaction of the attacker and the system using a formal security model -- a probabilistic attack graph. By allocating fake targets/decoys, the defender aims to distract the attacker from compromising true targets. By increasing the cost of some attack actions, the defender aims to discourage the attacker from committing to certain policies and thereby improve the defense. To optimize the defense given limited decoy resources and operational constraints, we formulate the synthesis problem as a bi-level optimization problem, while the defender designs the system, in anticipation of the attacker's best response given that the attacker has disinformation about the system due to the use of deception. Though the general formulation with bi-level optimization is NP-hard, we show that under certain assumptions, the problem can be transformed into a constrained optimization problem. We proposed an algorithm to approximately solve this constrained optimization problem using a novel incentive-design method for projected gradient ascent. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method using extensive numerical experiments.