Monitoring Security of Enterprise Hosts via DNS Data Analysis (2205.08968v1)

Abstract: Enterprise Networks are growing in scale and complexity, with heterogeneous connected assets needing to be secured in different ways. Nevertheless, virtually all connected assets use the Domain Name System (DNS) for address resolution, and DNS has thus become a convenient vehicle for attackers to covertly perform Command and Control (C&C) communication, data theft, and service disruption across a wide range of assets. Enterprise security appliances that monitor network traffic typically allow all DNS traffic through as it is vital for accessing any web service; they may at best match against a database of known malicious patterns, and are therefore ineffective against zero-day attacks. This thesis focuses on three high-impact cyber-attacks that leverage DNS, specifically data exfiltration, malware C&C communication, and service disruption. Using big data (over 10B packets) of DNS network traffic collected from a University campus and a Government research organization over a 6-month period, we illustrate the anatomy of these attacks, train machines for automatically detecting such attacks, and evaluate their efficacy in the field.