Prior-Independent Auctions for the Demand Side of Federated Learning (2103.14375v2)

Abstract: Federated learning (FL) is a paradigm that allows distributed clients to learn a shared machine learning model without sharing their sensitive training data. While largely decentralized, FL requires resources to fund a central orchestrator or to reimburse contributors of datasets to incentivize participation. Inspired by insights from prior-independent auction design, we propose a mechanism, FIPIA (Federated Incentive Payments via Prior-Independent Auctions), to collect monetary contributions from self-interested clients. The mechanism operates in the semi-honest trust model and works even if clients have a heterogeneous interest in receiving high-quality models, and the server does not know the clients' level of interest. We run experiments on the MNIST, FashionMNIST, and CIFAR-10 datasets to test clients' model quality under FIPIA and FIPIA's incentive properties.