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The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions
Published 20 Jul 2020 in cs.GT | (2007.10131v1)
Abstract: We study the efficiency of sequential multiunit auctions with two-buyers and complete information. For general valuation functions, we show that the price of anarchy is exactly $1/T$ for auctions with $T$ items for sale. For concave valuation functions, we show that the price of anarchy is bounded below by $1-1/e\simeq 0.632$. This bound is asymptotically tight as the number of items sold tends to infinity.
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