Co-Utility: Self-Enforcing Protocols without Coordination Mechanisms

Abstract: Performing some task among a set of agents requires the use of some protocol that regulates the interactions between them. If those agents are rational, they may try to subvert the protocol for their own benefit, in an attempt to reach an outcome that provides greater utility. We revisit the traditional notion of self-enforcing protocols implemented using existing game-theoretic solution concepts, we describe its shortcomings in real-world applications, and we propose a new notion of self-enforcing protocols, namely co-utile protocols. The latter represent a solution concept that can be implemented without a coordination mechanism in situations when traditional self-enforcing protocols need a coordination mechanism. Co-utile protocols are preferable in decentralized systems of rational agents because of their efficiency and fairness. We illustrate the application of co-utile protocols to information technology, specifically to preserving the privacy of query profiles of database/search engine users.