A Nash Equilibrium Need Not Exist in the Locational Marginal Pricing Mechanism (1310.4282v1)

Abstract: Locational marginal pricing (LMP) is a widely employed method for pricing electricity in the wholesale electricity market. Although it is well known that the LMP mechanism is vulnerable to market manipulation, there is little literature providing a systematic analysis of this phenomenon. In the first part of this paper, we investigate the economic dispatch outcomes of the LMP mechanism with strategic agents. We show via counterexamples, that contrary to popular belief, a Nash equilibrium may not exist. And when it exists, the price of anarchy may be arbitrarily large. We then provide two sufficient conditions under either of which an efficient Nash equilibria exists. Last, we propose a new market mechanism for electricity markets, the Power Network Second Price (PNSP) mechanism that always induces an efficient Nash equilibrium. We briefly address the extensions on the demand side.