A taxonomy of epistemic injustice in the context of AI and the case for generative hermeneutical erasure (2504.07531v1)

Abstract: Whether related to machine learning models' epistemic opacity, algorithmic classification systems' discriminatory automation of testimonial prejudice, the distortion of human beliefs via the 'hallucinations' of generative AI, the inclusion of the global South in global AI governance, the execution of bureaucratic violence via algorithmic systems, or located in the interaction with conversational artificial agents epistemic injustice related to AI is a growing concern. Based on a proposed general taxonomy of epistemic injustice, this paper first sketches a taxonomy of the types of epistemic injustice in the context of AI, relying on the work of scholars from the fields of philosophy of technology, political philosophy and social epistemology. Secondly, an additional perspective on epistemic injustice in the context of AI: generative hermeneutical erasure. I argue that this injustice that can come about through the application of LLMs and contend that generative AI, when being deployed outside of its Western space of conception, can have effects of conceptual erasure, particularly in the epistemic domain, followed by forms of conceptual disruption caused by a mismatch between AI system and the interlocutor in terms of conceptual frameworks. AI systems' 'view from nowhere' epistemically inferiorizes non-Western epistemologies and thereby contributes to the erosion of their epistemic particulars, gradually contributing to hermeneutical erasure. This work's relevance lies in proposal of a taxonomy that allows epistemic injustices to be mapped in the AI domain and the proposal of a novel form of AI-related epistemic injustice.