Lower Bounds for Leader Election and Collective Coin Flipping, Revisited (2504.01856v1)

Abstract: We study the tasks of collective coin flipping and leader election in the full-information model. We prove new lower bounds for coin flipping protocols, implying lower bounds for leader election protocols. We show that any $k$-round coin flipping protocol, where each of $\ell$ players sends 1 bit per round, can be biased by $O(\ell/\log^{(k)}(\ell))$ bad players. For all $k>1$ this strengthens previous lower bounds [RSZ, SICOMP 2002], which ruled out protocols resilient to adversaries controlling $O(\ell/\log^{(2k-1)}(\ell))$ players. Consequently, we establish that any protocol tolerating a linear fraction of corrupt players, with only 1 bit per round, must run for at least $\log^*\ell-O(1)$ rounds, improving on the prior best lower bound of $\frac12 \log^\ell-\log^\log^*\ell$. This lower bound matches the number of rounds, $\log^*\ell$, taken by the current best coin flipping protocols from [RZ, JCSS 2001], [F, FOCS 1999] that can handle a linear sized coalition of bad players, but with players sending unlimited bits per round. We also derive lower bounds for protocols allowing multi-bit messages per round. Our results show that the protocols from [RZ, JCSS 2001], [F, FOCS 1999] that handle a linear number of corrupt players are almost optimal in terms of round complexity and communication per player in a round. A key technical ingredient in proving our lower bounds is a new result regarding biasing most functions from a family of functions using a common set of bad players and a small specialized set of bad players specific to each function that is biased. We give improved constant-round coin flipping protocols in the setting that each player can send 1 bit per round. For two rounds, our protocol can handle $O(\ell/(\log\ell)(\log\log\ell)^2)$ sized coalition of bad players; better than the best one-round protocol by [AL, Combinatorica 1993] in this setting.