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TASR: A Novel Trust-Aware Stackelberg Routing Algorithm to Mitigate Traffic Congestion (2403.19831v1)

Published 28 Mar 2024 in cs.GT

Abstract: Stackelberg routing platforms (SRP) reduce congestion in one-shot traffic networks by proposing optimal route recommendations to selfish travelers. Traditionally, Stackelberg routing is cast as a partial control problem where a fraction of traveler flow complies with route recommendations, while the remaining respond as selfish travelers. In this paper, a novel Stackelberg routing framework is formulated where the agents exhibit \emph{probabilistic compliance} by accepting SRP's route recommendations with a \emph{trust} probability. A greedy \emph{\textbf{T}rust-\textbf{A}ware \textbf{S}tackelberg \textbf{R}outing} algorithm (in short, TASR) is proposed for SRP to compute unique path recommendations to each traveler flow with a unique demand. Simulation experiments are designed with random travel demands with diverse trust values on real road networks such as Sioux Falls, Chicago Sketch, and Sydney networks for both single-commodity and multi-commodity flows. The performance of TASR is compared with state-of-the-art Stackelberg routing methods in terms of traffic congestion and trust dynamics over repeated interaction between the SRP and the travelers. Results show that TASR improves network congestion without causing a significant reduction in trust towards the SRP, when compared to most well-known Stackelberg routing strategies.

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