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Multi-Agent Contract Design beyond Binary Actions (2402.13824v1)
Published 21 Feb 2024 in cs.GT
Abstract: We study hidden-action principal-agent problems with multiple agents. Unlike previous work, we consider a general setting in which each agent has an arbitrary number of actions, and the joint action induces outcomes according to an arbitrary distribution. We study two classes of mechanisms: a class of deterministic mechanisms that is the natural extension of single-agent contracts, in which the agents play a Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the contract, and a class of randomized mechanisms that is inspired by single-agent randomized contracts and correlated equilibria.
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