Exploring Leximin Principle for Fair Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auctions: Payment Rule Design and Implementation (2312.06443v1)
Abstract: Core-selecting combinatorial auctions (CAs) restrict the auction result in the core such that no coalitions could improve their utilities by engaging in collusion. The minimum-revenue-core (MRC) rule is a widely used core-selecting payment rule to maximize the total utilities of all bidders. However, the MRC rule can suffer from severe unfairness since it ignores individuals' utilities. To address this limitation, we propose to explore the leximin principle to achieve fairness in core-selecting CAs since the leximin principle prefers to maximize the utility of the worst-off; the resulting bidder-leximin-optimal (BLO) payment rule is then theoretically analyzed and an effective algorithm is further provided to compute the BLO outcome. Moreover, we conduct extensive experiments to show that our algorithm returns fairer utility distributions and is faster than existing algorithms of core-selecting payment rules.
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