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Facility Location Games Beyond Single-Peakedness: the Entrance Fee Model (2204.11282v2)
Published 24 Apr 2022 in cs.GT, cs.AI, and cs.DS
Abstract: The facility location game has been studied extensively in mechanism design. In the classical model, each agent's cost is solely determined by her distance to the nearest facility. In this paper, we introduce a novel model where each facility charges an entrance fee. Thus, the cost of each agent is determined by both the distance to the facility and the entrance fee of the facility. In our model, the entrance fee function is allowed to be an arbitrary function, causing agents' preferences may no longer be single-peaked anymore: This departure from the classical model introduces additional challenges. We systematically delve into the intricacies of the model, designing strategyproof mechanisms with favorable approximation ratios. Additionally, we complement these ratios with nearly-tight impossibility results. Specifically, for one-facility and two-facility games, we provide upper and lower bounds for the approximation ratios given by deterministic and randomized mechanisms with respect to utilitarian and egalitarian objectives.
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