Killing Science Fiction: Why Conscious States Cannot Be Copied or Repeated (1906.02813v1)

Abstract: Several philosophical problems arising from the physics of consciousness, including identity, duplication, teleportation, simulation, self-location, and the Boltzmann Brain problem, hinge on one of the most deeply held but unnecessary convictions of physicalism: the assumption that brain states and their corresponding conscious states can in principle be copied. In this paper I will argue against this assumption by attempting to prove the Unique History Theorem, which states, essentially, that conscious correlations to underlying quantum mechanical measurement events must increase with time and that every conscious state uniquely determines its history from an earlier conscious state. By assuming only that consciousness arises from an underlying physical state, I will argue that the physical evolution from a first physical state giving rise to a conscious state to a second physical state giving rise to a later conscious state is unique. Among the consequences of this theorem are that: consciousness is not algorithmic and a conscious state cannot be uploaded to or simulated by a digital computer; a conscious state cannot be copied by duplicating a brain or any other physical state; and a conscious state cannot be repeated or created de novo. These conclusions shed light on the physical nature of consciousness by rendering moot a variety of seemingly paradoxical philosophy and science fiction problems.

• The paper challenges the physicalist assumption that conscious states can be copied, proposing the Unique History Theorem which asserts consciousness is history-dependent based on quantum mechanics.
• Knight uses quantum mechanics and the Unique History Theorem to argue against the feasibility of Strong Artificial Intelligence and the replication of consciousness.
• The Unique History Theorem has significant implications for theories of AI, challenging the idea that consciousness is purely algorithmic and raising questions about identity and physicalism.

Analysis of "Killing Science Fiction: Why Conscious States Cannot Be Copied or Repeated" by Andrew Knight

The paper "Killing Science Fiction: Why Conscious States Cannot Be Copied or Repeated" by Andrew Knight offers a critical examination of the assumption prevalent in physicalism that conscious states, or their underlying brain states, can indeed be copied or repeated. Through rigorous exploration of quantum mechanics and its implications on consciousness, Knight attempts to challenge this foundational premise and argues in favor of the Unique History Theorem—a stance with significant ramifications for theories of artificial intelligence, identity, and consciousness.

Knight's paper is divided into a series of logical constructs, supported by quantum mechanical principles, specifically focusing on the phenomena of quantum correlation and entanglement. He postulates that the conventional view of conscious states as copiable or repeatable emerges primarily from a misconstrued analogy with more straightforward physical systems, like DNA or software algorithms, which lend themselves to duplication. The paper attempts to decouple this notion from physicalism, proposing instead that conscious experiences are inherently non-repeatable due to their history-dependent nature, an assertion formalized in his Unique History Theorem.

Unique History Theorem and Its Basis

Knight elaborates on a series of thought experiments and conceptual models, including entangled quantum systems, to draw a parallel with conscious states. The theorem posits that the correlation of conscious states to underlying quantum mechanical events must increase over time and that each conscious state is uniquely tethered to its specific history. This framework dismantles the idea of consciousness as an algorithmic process that could be simulated or transferred to a digital medium. The inability to replicate consciousness algorithmically points towards a fundamental disconnect between the perception of consciousness as a purely computational algorithm and the proposition that consciousness arises from quantum events that embed historical uniqueness.

Implications for Artificial Intelligence and Philosophy

The Unique History Theorem casts doubt on the feasibility of several long-held concepts, such as the prospect of Strong Artificial Intelligence, which assumes that consciousness could potentially be replicated within artificial systems. If consciousness cannot be distilled into a mere algorithm, the pursuit of conscious machines, as envisaged by contemporary AI endeavors, may be inherently flawed. This aligns with philosophical inquiries into the nature of identity and self; individual consciousness, shaped by its unique history of quantum correlations, cannot be perceived as something that can exist in multiple identical forms across different mediums.

Challenging Conventional Physicalism

Knight's investigation highlights the constraints of physicalism, especially when viewed through the lens of quantum mechanics. While physicalism does not necessitate the copiability of states, the tendency to equate consciousness with algorithmic processes inherently suggests replicability. Knight’s dismissal of such copiability reintroduces philosophical complexities about identity, provoking re-evaluation of what constitutes conscious awareness and its underpinning physical states. For instance, his argument against the existence of Boltzmann Brains underlines the complexities of associating consciousness strictly with brain configurations, underscoring a significant implication on theories espousing consciousness as a byproduct of brain function.

Conclusion and Prospective Research Roadmaps

Knight's exploration invites further theoretical and empirical research into the physicalistic assumptions of consciousness, suggesting avenues for interdisciplinary investigation across quantum mechanics, cognitive science, and philosophy. The insistence on the uniqueness and history-dependent nature of conscious experiences inevitably invites a reassessment of our expectations from technology concerning consciousness simulation and suggests a limitation on the potential scope of AI in replicating human-like awareness.

In summary, while Knight’s manuscript refrains from resolving the perennial debate on consciousness, it endeavors to rigorously question dominant assumptions within physicalism. These challenges provide a fertile ground for future discourse on the quantum underpinnings of consciousness and its implications on identity and artificial intelligence.