Papers
Topics
Authors
Recent
2000 character limit reached

Distributed Algorithms for Complete and Partial Information Games on Interference Channels

Published 29 Jan 2016 in cs.IT and math.IT | (1601.07976v1)

Abstract: We consider a Gaussian interference channel with independent direct and cross link channel gains, each of which is independent and identically distributed across time. Each transmitter-receiver user pair aims to maximize its long-term average transmission rate subject to an average power constraint. We formulate a stochastic game for this system in three different scenarios. First, we assume that each user knows all direct and cross link channel gains. Later, we assume that each user knows channel gains of only the links that are incident on its receiver. Lastly, we assume that each user knows only its own direct link channel gain. In all cases, we formulate the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium (NE) as a variational inequality (VI) problem. We present a novel heuristic for solving a VI. We use this heuristic to solve for a NE of power allocation games with partial information. We also present a lower bound on the utility for each user at any NE in the case of the games with partial information. We obtain this lower bound using a water-filling like power allocation that requires only knowledge of the distribution of a user's own channel gains and average power constraints of all the users. We also provide a distributed algorithm to compute Pareto optimal solutions for the proposed games. Finally, we use Bayesian learning to obtain an algorithm that converges to an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium for the incomplete information game with direct link channel gain knowledge only without requiring the knowledge of the power policies of the other users.

Summary

Paper to Video (Beta)

Whiteboard

No one has generated a whiteboard explanation for this paper yet.

Open Problems

We haven't generated a list of open problems mentioned in this paper yet.

Continue Learning

We haven't generated follow-up questions for this paper yet.

Collections

Sign up for free to add this paper to one or more collections.