Thinking Twice about Second-Price Ad Auctions (0809.1895v1)

Abstract: Recent work has addressed the algorithmic problem of allocating advertisement space for keywords in sponsored search auctions so as to maximize revenue, most of which assume that pricing is done via a first-price auction. This does not realistically model the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used in practice, in which bidders pay the next-highest bid for keywords that they are allocated. Towards the goal of more realistically modeling these auctions, we introduce the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem, in which bidders' payments are determined by the GSP mechanism. We show that the complexity of the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem is quite different than that of the more studied First-Price Ad Auctions problem. First, unlike the first-price variant, for which small constant-factor approximations are known, it is NP-hard to approximate the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem to any non-trivial factor, even when the bids are small compared to the budgets. Second, this discrepancy extends even to the 0-1 special case that we call the Second-Price Matching problem (2PM). Offline 2PM is APX-hard, and for online 2PM there is no deterministic algorithm achieving a non-trivial competitive ratio and no randomized algorithm achieving a competitive ratio better than 2. This contrasts with the results for the analogous special case in the first-price model, the standard bipartite matching problem, which is solvable in polynomial time and which has deterministic and randomized online algorithms achieving better competitive ratios. On the positive side, we provide a 2-approximation for offline 2PM and a 5.083-competitive randomized algorithm for online 2PM. The latter result makes use of a new generalization of a result on the performance of the "Ranking" algorithm for online bipartite matching.