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SIGY: Breaking Intel SGX Enclaves with Malicious Exceptions & Signals (2404.13998v1)

Published 22 Apr 2024 in cs.CR

Abstract: User programs recover from hardware exceptions and respond to signals by executing custom handlers that they register specifically for such events. We present SIGY attack, which abuses this programming model on Intel SGX to break the confidentiality and integrity guarantees of enclaves. SIGY uses the untrusted OS to deliver fake hardware events and injects fake signals in an enclave at any point. Such unintended execution of benign program-defined handlers in an enclave corrupts its state and violates execution integrity. 7 runtimes and library OSes (OpenEnclave, Gramine, Scone, Asylo, Teaclave, Occlum, EnclaveOS) are vulnerable to SIGY. 8 languages supported in Intel SGX have programming constructs that are vulnerable to SIGY. We use SIGY to demonstrate 4 proof of concept exploits on webservers (Nginx, Node.js) to leak secrets and data analytics workloads in different languages (C and Java) to break execution integrity.

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