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Robust Popular Matchings (2401.12653v1)

Published 23 Jan 2024 in cs.DS and cs.GT

Abstract: We study popularity for matchings under preferences. This solution concept captures matchings that do not lose against any other matching in a majority vote by the agents. A popular matching is said to be robust if it is popular among multiple instances. We present a polynomial-time algorithm for deciding whether there exists a robust popular matching if instances only differ with respect to the preferences of a single agent while obtaining NP-completeness if two instances differ only by a downward shift of one alternative by four agents. Moreover, we find a complexity dichotomy based on preference completeness for the case where instances differ by making some options unavailable.

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