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An Incentive Regulation Approach for Balancing Stakeholder Interests in Transmission Investment (2401.03556v2)

Published 7 Jan 2024 in math.OC

Abstract: The merchant-regulatory mechanism represents a promising tool that combines the benefits of merchant investment and regulated investment, thereby providing efficient incentives for merchant Transmission Companies (Transcos) subject to regulatory compliance. However, one of the drawbacks of the H-R-G-V merchant-regulated mechanism is that it allows the Transco to capture the entire surplus increase resulting from investment, without any economic benefits for consumers and generators. To address this issue, we propose an incentive tuning parameter, which is incorporated into the calculation of the incentive fee for the Transco. Accordingly, the regulatory framework can effectively manage the Transco's profit and allow market participants to access economic benefits, thus ensuring a fair distribution of economic advantages among the stakeholders, while the impact on overall social welfare remains relatively modest.

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