Pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium for Bayesian games with multidimensional vector Types and linear payoffs (2310.13992v1)

Abstract: We study $n$-agent Bayesian Games with $m$-dimensional vector types and linear payoffs, also called Linear Multidimensional Bayesian Games. This class of games is equivalent with $n$-agent, $m$-game Uniform Multigames. We distinguish between games that have a discrete type space and those with a continuous type space. More specifically, we are interested in the existence of pure Bayesian Nash Equilibrium for such games and efficient algorithms to find them. For continuous priors we suggest a methodology to perform Nash Equilibrium search in simple cases. For discrete priors we present algorithms that can handle two actions and two players games efficiently. We introduce the core concept of threshold strategy and, under some mild conditions, we show that these games have at least one pure Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. We illustrate our results with several examples like Double Game Prisoner Dilemna (DGPD), Chicken Game and Sustainable Adoption Decision Problem (SADP).