Complex Pathways to Cooperation Emergent from Asymmetry in Heterogeneous Populations (2310.07615v2)
Abstract: Cooperation within asymmetric populations has garnered significant attention in evolutionary games. This paper explores cooperation evolution in populations with weak and strong players, using a game model where players choose between cooperation and defection. Asymmetry stems from different benefits for strong and weak cooperators, with their benefit ratio indicating the degree of asymmetry. Varied rankings of parameters including the asymmetry degree, cooperation costs, and benefits brought by weak players give rise to scenarios including the prisoner's dilemma (PDG) for both player types, the snowdrift game (SDG), and mixed PDG-SDG interactions. Our results indicate that in an infinite well-mixed population, defection remains the dominant strategy when strong players engage in the prisoner's dilemma game. However, if strong players play snowdrift games, global cooperation increases with the proportion of strong players. In this scenario, strong cooperators can prevail over strong defectors when the proportion of strong players is low, but the prevalence of cooperation among strong players decreases as their proportion increases. In contrast, within a square lattice, the optimum global cooperation emerges at intermediate proportions of strong players with moderate degrees of asymmetry. Additionally, weak players protect cooperative clusters from exploitation by strong defectors. This study highlights the complex dynamics of cooperation in asymmetric interactions, contributing to the theory of cooperation in asymmetric games.
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