Thermal (and Hybrid Thermal/Audio) Side-Channel Attacks on Keyboard Input (2210.02234v1)

Abstract: To date, there has been no systematic investigation of thermal profiles of keyboards, and thus no efforts have been made to secure them. This serves as our main motivation for constructing a means for password harvesting from keyboard thermal emanations. Specifically, we introduce Thermanator: a new post-factum insider attack based on heat transfer caused by a user typing a password on a typical external (plastic) keyboard. We conduct and describe a user study that collected thermal residues from 30 users entering 10 unique passwords (both weak and strong) on 4 popular commodity keyboards. Results show that entire sets of key-presses can be recovered by non-expert users as late as 30 seconds after initial password entry, while partial sets can be recovered as late as 1 minute after entry. However, the thermal residue side-channel lacks information about password length, duplicate key-presses, and key-press ordering. To overcome these limitations, we leverage keyboard acoustic emanations and combine the two to yield AcuTherm, the first hybrid side-channel attack on keyboards. AcuTherm significantly reduces password search without the need for any training on the victim's typing. We report results gathered for many representative passwords based on a user study involving 19 subjects. The takeaway of this work is three-fold: (1) using plastic keyboards to enter secrets (such as passwords and PINs) is even less secure than previously recognized, (2) post-factum thermal imaging attacks are realistic, and (3) hybrid (multiple side-channel) attacks are both realistic and effective.