Attack Identification and Correction for PMU GPS Spoofing in Unbalanced Distribution Systems (2002.10655v1)

Abstract: Due to the vulnerability of civilian global positioning system (GPS) signals, the accuracy of phasor measurement units (PMUs) can be greatly compromised by GPS spoofing attacks (GSAs), which introduce phase shifts into true phase angle measurements. Focusing on simultaneous GSAs for multiple PMU locations, this paper proposes a novel identification and correction algorithm in distribution systems. A sensitivity analysis of state estimation residuals on a single GSA phase angle is firstly implemented. An identification algorithm using a probing technique is proposed to determine the locations of spoofed PMUs and the ranges of GSA phase shifts. Based on the identification results, these GSA phase shifts are determined via an estimation algorithm that minimizes the mismatch between measurements and system states. Further, with the attacked PMU data corrected, the system states are recovered. Simulations in unbalanced IEEE 34-bus and 123-bus distribution systems demonstrates the efficiency and accuracy of the proposed method.