Incentive-Compatible Classification

Abstract: We investigate the possibility of an incentive-compatible (IC, a.k.a. strategy-proof) mechanism for the classification of agents in a network according to their reviews of each other. In the $ \alpha $-classification problem we are interested in selecting the top $ \alpha $ fraction of users. We give upper bounds (impossibilities) and lower bounds (mechanisms) on the worst-case coincidence between the classification of an IC mechanism and the ideal $ \alpha $-classification. We prove bounds which depend on $ \alpha $ and on the maximal number of reviews given by a single agent, $ \Delta $. Our results show that it is harder to find a good mechanism when $ \alpha $ is smaller and $ \Delta $ is larger. In particular, if $ \Delta $ is unbounded, then the best mechanism is trivial (that is, it does not take into account the reviews). On the other hand, when $ \Delta $ is sublinear in the number of agents, we give a simple, natural mechanism, with a coincidence ratio of $ \alpha $.