Competition and partnership between conformity and payoff-based imitations in social dilemmas (1809.05079v1)

Abstract: Learning from a partner who collects higher payoff is a frequently used working hypothesis in evolutionary game theory. One of the alternative dynamical rules is when the focal player prefers to follow the strategy choice of the majority in the local neighborhood, which is often called as conformity-driven strategy update. In this work we assume that both strategy learning methods are present and compete for space within the framework of a coevolutionary model. Our results reveal that the presence of payoff-driven strategy learning method becomes exclusive for high succer's payoff and/or high temptation values that represent a snowdrift game dilemma situation. In general, however, the competition of the mentioned strategy learning methods could be useful to enlarge the parameter space where only cooperators prevail. This success of cooperation is based on the enforced coordination of cooperator players which reveals the benefit of the latter strategy. Interestingly, the payoff-based and the conformity-based cooperator players can form an effective alliance against defectors that can also extend the parameter space of full cooperator solution in the stag-hunt game region. Our work highlights that the coevolution of strategies and individual features such as learning method can provide novel type of pattern formation mechanism that cannot be observed in a static model, hence remains hidden in traditional models.