Secure Estimation for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles against Adversarial Cyber Attacks (1606.04176v1)

Abstract: In the coming years, usage of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) is expected to grow tremendously. Maintaining security of UAVs under cyber attacks is an important yet challenging task, as these attacks are often erratic and difficult to predict. Secure estimation problems study how to estimate the states of a dynamical system from a set of noisy and maliciously corrupted sensor measurements. The fewer assumptions that an estimator makes about the attacker, the larger the set of attacks it can protect the system against. In this paper, we focus on sensor attacks on UAVs and attempt to design a secure estimator for linear time-invariant systems based on as few assumptions about the attackers as possible. We propose a computationally efficient estimator that protects the system against arbitrary and unbounded attacks, where the set of attacked sensors can also change over time. In addition, we propose to combine our secure estimator with a Kalman Filter for improved practical performance and demonstrate its effectiveness through simulations of two scenarios where an UAV is under adversarial cyber attack.