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My Software has a Vulnerability, should I worry? (1301.1275v3)

Published 7 Jan 2013 in cs.CR

Abstract: (U.S) Rule-based policies to mitigate software risk suggest to use the CVSS score to measure the individual vulnerability risk and act accordingly: an HIGH CVSS score according to the NVD (National (U.S.) Vulnerability Database) is therefore translated into a "Yes". A key issue is whether such rule is economically sensible, in particular if reported vulnerabilities have been actually exploited in the wild, and whether the risk score do actually match the risk of actual exploitation. We compare the NVD dataset with two additional datasets, the EDB for the white market of vulnerabilities (such as those present in Metasploit), and the EKITS for the exploits traded in the black market. We benchmark them against Symantec's threat explorer dataset (SYM) of actual exploit in the wild. We analyze the whole spectrum of CVSS submetrics and use these characteristics to perform a case-controlled analysis of CVSS scores (similar to those used to link lung cancer and smoking) to test its reliability as a risk factor for actual exploitation. We conclude that (a) fixing just because a high CVSS score in NVD only yields negligible risk reduction, (b) the additional existence of proof of concepts exploits (e.g. in EDB) may yield some additional but not large risk reduction, (c) fixing in response to presence in black markets yields the equivalent risk reduction of wearing safety belt in cars (you might also die but still..). On the negative side, our study shows that as industry we miss a metric with high specificity (ruling out vulns for which we shouldn't worry). In order to address the feedback from BlackHat 2013's audience, the final revision (V3) provides additional data in Appendix A detailing how the control variables in the study affect the results.

Citations (167)

Summary

  • The paper shows that relying solely on high CVSS scores for vulnerability remediation provides negligible risk reduction.
  • It finds that vulnerabilities traded on the black market are more indicative of real-world exploitation than CVSS metrics alone.
  • The study recommends integrating contextual factors with CVSS submetrics to enhance the accuracy of vulnerability risk assessments.

Evaluating Software Vulnerability Risk Mitigation Strategies

The paper "My Software has a Vulnerability, Should I Worry?" by Luca Allodi and Fabio Massacci investigates the practical implications of using the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) for assessing and prioritizing the remediation of software vulnerabilities. The research critically examines whether rule-based policies for software risk mitigation, which often rely on CVSS scores, are economically sensible and effective in reducing exploitation risk in the wild.

The authors compare data from the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) against datasets from Metasploit, Exploit-DB, and commercial security solutions like Symantec. The aim is to understand whether CVSS scores correlate with actual exploitation, both in the white market for vulnerabilities and the black market for exploits. A randomized case-controlled paper is conducted to test this correlation and assess the reliability of CVSS as a risk metric.

Key Findings

  1. Rule-based policies inefficacy: The research concludes that fixing software solely based on high CVSS scores yields negligible risk reduction. The implication is that relying on CVSS scores for prioritizing vulnerability remediation may not be economically justified in terms of reducing exploitation risk.
  2. Exploits from Black Markets as Indicators: Vulnerabilities with exploits traded in black markets showed a significant correlation with being exploited in the wild. The paper suggests considering the presence of exploits in the black market as a more reliable risk indicator than CVSS scores alone.
  3. Importance of CVSS Submetrics: The paper emphasizes that neither the CVSS Exploitability nor Impact scores provide high specificity for ruling out uninteresting vulnerabilities (those unlikely to be exploited). Vulnerabilities with high Exploitability or Impact scores are not always the ones exploited in the wild.
  4. Trade-offs in Exploitation Complexity: The paper reveals that vulnerabilities with medium complexity are prioritized by attackers if they have high impact, indicating a trade-off where exploit complexity is favorable if the potential damage is substantial.

Implications for Future Research

The insights from this paper suggest potential avenues for improving vulnerability assessments and the CVSS framework. Future research could explore integrating contextual factors such as software popularity, ease of exploitability, and market presence of vulnerabilities to better predict exploitation risk. Enhancing specificity and sensitivity in vulnerability metrics could lead to more accurate risk assessments, aiding in more effective remediation decisions.

Practical Implications

From a practical standpoint, the research questions the current reliance on CVSS scores for risk mitigation and proposes alternative approaches, such as incorporating black market exploit data and other contextual factors into vulnerability assessment strategies. This approach could lead to more efficient prioritization of patching efforts, particularly in environments where resource constraints limit the ability to address every vulnerability.

Ultimately, this paper underscores the necessity of refining vulnerability assessment methodologies to better capture the dynamic nature of cyber threats and exploits in the current security landscape.