Direct reciprocity in asynchronous interactions (2506.04264v1)

Abstract: Cooperation is vital for the survival of living systems but is challenging due to the costs borne by altruistic individuals. Direct reciprocity, where actions are based on past encounters, is a key mechanism fostering cooperation. However, most studies assume synchronous decision-making, whereas real-world interactions are often asynchronous, with individuals acting in sequence. This asynchrony can undermine standard cooperative strategies like Tit-for-Tat and Win-Stay Lose-Shift. To better understand cooperation in real-world contexts, it is crucial to explore the theory of direct reciprocity in asynchronous interactions. To address this, we introduce a framework based on asynchronous stochastic games, incorporating asynchronous decisions and dynamic environmental feedback. We analytically derive the conditions under which strategies form cooperative Nash equilibria. Our results demonstrate that the order of interactions can significantly alter outcomes: interaction asynchrony generally inhibits cooperation, except under specific conditions where environmental feedback effectively mitigates its negative impact. When environmental feedback is incorporated, a variety of stable reciprocal strategies can be sustained. Notably, above a critical environmental threshold, any cooperative strategy can form a Nash equilibrium. Overall, our work underscores the importance of interaction order in long-term evolutionary processes and highlights the pivotal role of environmental feedback in stabilizing cooperation in asynchronous interactions.