Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Strategies for Linear Quadratic Mean Field Games: The Direct Approach

Abstract: This paper delves into studying the differences and connections between open-loop and closed-loop strategies for the linear quadratic (LQ) mean field games (MFGs) by the direct approach. The investigation begins with the finite-population system for solving the solvability of open-loop and closed-loop systems within a unified framework under the global information pattern. By a comprehensive analysis through variational methods, the necessary and sufficient conditions are obtained for the existence of centralized open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria, which are characterized by the solvability of a system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations and a system of Riccati equations, respectively. The connections and disparities between centralized open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria are analyzed. Then, the decentralized control is designed by studying the asymptotic solvability for both open-loop and closed-loop systems. Asymptotically decentralized Nash equilibria are obtained by considering the centralized open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria in the infinite-population system, which requires a standard and an asymmetric Riccati equations. The results demonstrate that divergences between the centralized open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria in the finite-population system, but the corresponding asymptotically decentralized Nash equilibria in the infinite-population system are consistent. Therefore, the choice of open-loop and closed-loop strategies does not play an essential role in the design of decentralized control for LQ MFGs.