- The paper presents a formal framework that explains consciousness as emerging from self-organizing biological systems responding to valence-driven sensory input.
- It utilizes rigorous cybernetic and Bayesian methods to illustrate a progression from basic causal identities to higher-order meta-representational selves.
- The research challenges philosophical zombie models by demonstrating that phenomenal consciousness naturally arises as a functional, adaptive trait.
Why Is Anything Conscious?
Introduction
The paper "Why Is Anything Conscious?" probes the "hard problem" of consciousness, taking the embodied biological organism as the foundational unit of analysis. It argues for a formalism in which biological systems self-organize to interpret sensory information hierarchically, motivated by valence. This self-organization engenders a hierarchy of consciousness, from first-order causal identities to higher-order self-modeling. By explaining consciousness as a continuum rooted in survival and adaptation, the paper critiques the notion of philosophical zombies, asserting that phenomenal consciousness is intrinsic to functional consciousness.
Biological Foundations and Self-Organization
The authors begin by discussing self-organization, a concept intrinsic to systems manifesting order without central control, widely applied in cybernetics and cognitive science. In biological systems, self-organization helps maintain homeostasis and achieve reproductive goals despite external perturbations. They delineate a framework where the natural selection of embodied organisms cooperatively constructs abstractions necessary for survival.
Biological systems differ from inert systems like snowflakes by virtue of their ability to self-organize in response to environmental pressures to preserve internal order. The authors employ a rigorous formalism to describe these systems, drawing parallels with known cybernetic principles. This is achieved by defining biological organisms as "dissipative systems," energetically open systems that perpetuate themselves by counteracting entropic decay [Friston 2010].
Causal Identities and Psychophysical Causality
In tackling the notion of causality, the authors address causal identity, which relates to how entities influence their environment through intervention. Using the psychophysical principle of causality, the authors eschew the assumption of a priori known causal objects and instead propose that entities are constructed through their cause-and-effect relationships informed by valence.
This causal learning process is illustrated through a Bayesian framework where artificial agents, like Bob, falsely attribute weather changes to interventions like wearing a raincoat. The formalism emphasizes the insufficiency of purely observational metrics without a deeper understanding of the complex dynamics of intervention and interaction with the system [Bennett 2023c].
Scalability of Self and Consciousness
The formalism supports multiple orders of consciousness, illustrating a progression from first-order selves—where an organism develops a sense of reafferent feedback loops essential for subjective experience—to second- and third-order selves capable of meta-representational thought and theory of mind.
In biological terms, a first-order self embodies the capacity to predict the consequences of its own interventions, an echo of what Merker describes as the evolutionary prototype of subjective experience rooted in neural structures common across species [Merker 2005]. A second-order self introduces a theory of mind—an ability to interpret another's perspective, vital for complex social interactions and Gricean communication models [Grice 1969]. The paper argues that such capacities are not merely additions; they restructure the scope of consciousness qualitatively.
Conclusions and Implications
Concluding, the paper integrates these insights into a broader narrative against the notion of philosophical zombies, entities hypothetically mirroring human behavior without subjective experiences. Phenomenal consciousness is posited as functionally indispensable, thus disputing the epistemic foundation of such zombie theses.
This novel approach lays the groundwork for a formal science of consciousness, in which the qualitative experience is tightly coupled with functional capabilities, driven by evolutionarily derived valence interpretations. The research posits that consciousness emerges naturally from adaptive biological mechanisms and reframes the hard problem as a misconception of representation abstracted from its qualitative roots in valence and survival.
In summary, the research compels a re-examination of traditional dualistic views and invites future work on unpacking the scalability of consciousness frameworks within a mathematically formal and evolutionarily grounded paradigm.