On Strongly-equitable Social Welfare Orders Without the Axiom of Choice (2406.08684v1)

Abstract: Social welfare orders seek to combine the disparate preferences of an infinite sequence of generations into a single, societal preference order in some reasonably-equitable way. In [2] Dubey and Laguzzi study a type of social welfare order which they call SEA, for strongly equitable and (finitely) anonymous. They prove that the existence of a SEA order implies the existence of a set of reals which does not have the Baire property, and observe that a nonprincipal ultrafilter on $\mathbb{N}$ can be used to construct a SEA order. Questions arising in their work include whether the existence of a SEA order implies the existence of either a set of real numbers which is not Lebesgue-measurable or of a nonprincipal ultrafilter on $\mathbb{N}$. We answer both these questions, the solution to the second using the techniques of geometric set theory as set out by Larson and Zapletal in [11]. The outcome is that the existence of a SEA order does imply the existence of a set of reals which is not Lebesgue-measurable, and does not imply the existence of a nonprincipal ultrafilter on $\mathbb{N}$.