HoneyGPT: Breaking the Trilemma in Terminal Honeypots with Large Language Model (2406.01882v1)

Abstract: Honeypots, as a strategic cyber-deception mechanism designed to emulate authentic interactions and bait unauthorized entities, continue to struggle with balancing flexibility, interaction depth, and deceptive capability despite their evolution over decades. Often they also lack the capability of proactively adapting to an attacker's evolving tactics, which restricts the depth of engagement and subsequent information gathering. Under this context, the emergent capabilities of LLMs, in tandem with pioneering prompt-based engineering techniques, offer a transformative shift in the design and deployment of honeypot technologies. In this paper, we introduce HoneyGPT, a pioneering honeypot architecture based on ChatGPT, heralding a new era of intelligent honeypot solutions characterized by their cost-effectiveness, high adaptability, and enhanced interactivity, coupled with a predisposition for proactive attacker engagement. Furthermore, we present a structured prompt engineering framework that augments long-term interaction memory and robust security analytics. This framework, integrating thought of chain tactics attuned to honeypot contexts, enhances interactivity and deception, deepens security analytics, and ensures sustained engagement. The evaluation of HoneyGPT includes two parts: a baseline comparison based on a collected dataset and a field evaluation in real scenarios for four weeks. The baseline comparison demonstrates HoneyGPT's remarkable ability to strike a balance among flexibility, interaction depth, and deceptive capability. The field evaluation further validates HoneyGPT's efficacy, showing its marked superiority in enticing attackers into more profound interactive engagements and capturing a wider array of novel attack vectors in comparison to existing honeypot technologies.