Insecurity of Quantum Two-Party Computation with Applications to Cheat-Sensitive Protocols and Oblivious Transfer Reductions (2405.12121v2)

Abstract: Oblivious transfer (OT) is a fundamental primitive for secure two-party computation. It is well known that OT cannot be implemented with information-theoretic security if the two players only have access to noiseless communication channels, even in the quantum case. As a result, weaker variants of OT have been studied. In this work, we rigorously establish the impossibility of cheat-sensitive OT, where a dishonest party can cheat, but risks being detected. We construct a general attack on any quantum protocol that allows the receiver to compute all inputs of the sender and provide an explicit upper bound on the success probability of this attack. This implies that cheat-sensitive quantum Symmetric Private Information Retrieval cannot be implemented with statistical information-theoretic security. Leveraging the techniques devised for our proofs, we provide entropic bounds on primitives needed for secure function evaluation. They imply impossibility results for protocols where the players have access to OT as a resource. This result significantly improves upon existing bounds and yields tight bounds for reductions of 1-out-of-n OT to a resource primitive. Our results hold in particular for transformations between a finite number of primitives and for any error.