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POSTER: Testing network-based RTK for GNSS receiver security (2405.10906v1)

Published 17 May 2024 in cs.CR

Abstract: Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) provide precise location, while Real Time Kinematics (RTK) allow mobile receivers (termed rovers), leveraging fixed stations, to correct errors in their Position Navigation and Timing (PNT) solution. This allows compensating for multi-path effects, ionospheric errors, and observation biases, enabling consumer receivers to achieve centimeter-level accuracy. While network distribution of correction streams can be protected with common secure networking practices, the reference stations can still be attacked by GNSS spoofing or jamming. This work investigates (i) the effect RTK reference station spoofing has on the rover's PNT solution quality and (ii) the potential countermeasures towards hardening the RTK infrastructure.

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References (8)
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Citations (1)

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