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Influencer Cartels (2405.10231v2)
Published 16 May 2024 in econ.GN, cs.CY, cs.LG, and q-fin.EC
Abstract: Social media influencers account for a growing share of marketing worldwide. We demonstrate the existence of a novel form of market failure in this advertising market: influencer cartels, where groups of influencers collude to increase their advertising revenue by inflating their engagement. Our theoretical model shows that influencer cartels can improve consumer welfare if they expand social media engagement to the target audience, or reduce welfare if they divert engagement to less relevant audiences. Drawing on the model's insights, we empirically examine influencer cartels using novel datasets and machine learning tools, and derive policy implications.
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