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A Partially Defined Game with Payments (2405.07591v1)
Published 13 May 2024 in cs.GT and math.OC
Abstract: We investigate a new problem that can be solved by using the theory of a partially defined game. We consider the situation described below: first, we assume that the worth of the grand and singleton coalitions is only known. It take some amount of costs to obtain worth of larger coalitions. If it is performed, then players make a payment from the worth of the grand coalition. That is, the worth of the grand coalition is reduced by examinations of coalitional worth. The problem of a partially defined game with payments is finding the solution of partially defined games at each point and the best exiting rule of examinations of coalitional worth.
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