Qualia and the Formal Structure of Meaning (2405.01148v1)

Abstract: This work explores the hypothesis that subjectively attributed meaning constitutes the phenomenal content of conscious experience. That is, phenomenal content is semantic. This form of subjective meaning manifests as an intrinsic and non-representational character of qualia. Empirically, subjective meaning is ubiquitous in conscious experiences. We point to phenomenological studies that lend evidence to support this. Furthermore, this notion of meaning closely relates to what Frege refers to as "sense", in metaphysics and philosophy of language. It also aligns with Peirce's "interpretant", in semiotics. We discuss how Frege's sense can also be extended to the raw feels of consciousness. Sense and reference both play a role in phenomenal experience. Moreover, within the context of the mind-matter relation, we provide a formalization of subjective meaning associated to one's mental representations. Identifying the precise maps between the physical and mental domains, we argue that syntactic and semantic structures transcend language, and are realized within each of these domains. Formally, meaning is a relational attribute, realized via a map that interprets syntactic structures of a formal system within an appropriate semantic space. The image of this map within the mental domain is what is relevant for experience, and thus comprises the phenomenal content of qualia. We conclude with possible implications this may have for experience-based theories of consciousness.

• The paper argues subjective meaning is a core, intrinsic aspect of qualia, challenging conventional representational models of consciousness.
• It proposes a formal structure using principles like functorial semantics to link physical and mental domains and integrate syntactic/semantic constructs.
• The findings suggest re-evaluating consciousness models relying on computational paradigms and hint at new AI approaches integrating subjective meaning.

An Essay Exploring "Qualia and the Formal Structure of Meaning"

The paper "Qualia and the Formal Structure of Meaning" by Xerxes D. Arsiwalla undertakes a profound exploration of the hypothesis that the subjective meaning attributed to consciousness is intrinsic and essential to the qualia experienced in conscious states. The paper's thesis implies that phenomenal content—known as qualia—is inherently semantic, manifesting as an intrinsic, non-representational characteristic of experience.

In examining this hypothesis, the paper reviews phenomenological studies and philosophical discourse. It draws parallels with Frege's notion of "sense" in philosophical semantics and Peirce's "interpretant" in semiotics, extending these ideas to consider the raw feels of consciousness or qualia. Arsiwalla argues that meaning, much like syntactic and semantic structures, transcends language and is deeply embedded in one's mental and physical manifestations.

Core Arguments and Propositions

The paper's primary argument asserts that subjective meaning is a core phenomenal aspect of all conscious experiences, challenging the typical representational accounts of consciousness which often hinge upon computing or descriptive models. Arsiwalla delineates two critical aspects required for a comprehensive theory of consciousness: a paradigm accommodating subjective experience from a first-person intrinsic view and a metaphysical framework for formalizing non-representational mental entities.

By analyzing evidence from phenomenology and cognitive sciences, the paper seeks to establish that personal significance is a universal attribute of qualia. Experiences such as profound emotions, existential realizations, intuitive insights, and even the appreciation of aesthetics, all exhibit a deeply personal layer of meaning that defies objective conveyance.

Furthermore, Arsiwalla explores whether raw sensory qualia are imbued with subjective meaning. This analysis involves the philosophical concept of "sense," particularly exploring whether a sensory experience (the raw feel of consciousness) can possess a subjective "sense" that constitutes its meaning. The analysis extends Frege's distinction between sense and reference from the domain of language to that of mental representations, positing that mental representations harbor intrinsic meanings akin to linguistic expressions.

The Formal Structure of Meaning

A significant portion of Arsiwalla's treatise is devoted to formulating a formal structure that encapsulates subjective meaning within the mind-matter relationship. The proposed formal structure involves specific mapping between physical and mental domains, defining how syntactic constructs (from these domains) integrate into semantic spaces, echoing principles of functorial semantics and category theory.

Within this framework, relations in the mental domain (Rel_M) emerge as semantic spaces that facilitate the interpretation of syntactic constructs (Obj_M) into intrinsic meanings. This model serves as a conduit linking the physical world to mental representations through association and representation maps.

Implications and Future Research

The implications of this discussion extend into the philosophy of mind and artificial intelligence. Should subjective meaning as the essence of qualia become a cornerstone of consciousness explanation, it could necessitate re-evaluation of current models of consciousness that heavily rely on computational or informational paradigms.

For AI, exploring a framework where machines can engage in meaning-making akin to subjective qualia could transform approaches to machine learning and synthetic consciousness. While objective computation defines much of AI development today, integrating a theory of subjective meaning could enhance AI's capacity to emulate human-like understanding and creativity.

Conclusion

Arsiwalla's paper presents a compelling thesis that meaning, deeply subjective and inherently part of conscious experience, must be accounted for in any complete theory of consciousness. By extending and formalizing ideas from linguistic philosophy and cognitive semantics, it opens new avenues for examining consciousness's non-representational aspects. This work underscores the importance of meaning in the phenomenology of consciousness, presenting it as both a metaphysical challenge and a potential cornerstone for future theoretical advancements.