Debunking Robot Rights Metaphysically, Ethically, and Legally (2404.10072v1)

Abstract: In this work we challenge arguments for robot rights on metaphysical, ethical and legal grounds. Metaphysically, we argue that machines are not the kinds of things that may be denied or granted rights. Building on theories of phenomenology and post-Cartesian approaches to cognitive science, we ground our position in the lived reality of actual humans in an increasingly ubiquitously connected, controlled, digitized, and surveilled society. Ethically, we argue that, given machines current and potential harms to the most marginalized in society, limits on (rather than rights for) machines should be at the centre of current AI ethics debate. From a legal perspective, the best analogy to robot rights is not human rights but corporate rights, a highly controversial concept whose most important effect has been the undermining of worker, consumer, and voter rights by advancing the power of capital to exercise outsized influence on politics and law. The idea of robot rights, we conclude, acts as a smoke screen, allowing theorists and futurists to fantasize about benevolently sentient machines with unalterable needs and desires protected by law. While such fantasies have motivated fascinating fiction and art, once they influence legal theory and practice articulating the scope of rights claims, they threaten to immunize from legal accountability the current AI and robotics that is fuelling surveillance capitalism, accelerating environmental destruction, and entrenching injustice and human suffering.

• The paper debunks robot rights by demonstrating that machines lack intrinsic qualities like consciousness and emotion.
• It highlights ethical concerns by showing that focusing on robot rights can overshadow urgent human and environmental issues.
• It argues that extending rights to robots may empower corporate interests and undermine legal accountability in technology governance.

Debunking the Concept of Robot Rights from Multiple Perspectives

Introduction

The question of whether robots and artificially intelligent systems should have rights has spurred considerable debate across various fields, including philosophy, ethics, and law. This paper scrutinizes the arguments in favor of robot rights and strongly contests them on metaphysical, ethical, and legal grounds. The authors assert that considering rights for robots distracts from more pressing human and environmental concerns, potentially exacerbating existing inequalities and diverting attention from the accountability of powerful corporations.

Metaphysical Considerations

The metaphysical arguments against robot rights are grounded in the nature of machines themselves. The paper argues that machines, by their very definition, lack the inherent qualities that would necessitate rights. Unlike humans and even animals, machines do not possess consciousness, emotions, or the ability to experience suffering. Any projection of such qualities onto machines is a fallacy, arising from anthropomorphization rather than any empirical qualities inherent to the machines.

Ethical Implications

Ethically, the push for robot rights is critiqued for overshadowing the harms AI and robotics inflict, particularly on marginalized groups. The paper highlights how the current deployment of AI systems contributes to surveillance, environmental degradation, and the entrenchment of socio-economic inequalities. By focusing on hypothetical rights of robots, discourse risks ignoring the very real and immediate consequences of these technologies on human lives and the environment. It advocates for a shift in focus towards ensuring that technology serves the rights and needs of the most vulnerable in society, rather than conferring rights on the tools that may deepen their plight.

Legal Perspectives

From a legal standpoint, the analogy that best suits the discussion about robot rights is not human rights but corporate rights. The notion of corporate rights, while legally established, remains controversial for its role in undermining democratic processes and promoting the interests of capital over individuals. The paper argues that extending rights to robots would similarly prioritize machine autonomy over human welfare and environmental sustainability, further empowering corporations at the expense of societal accountability and governance.

Societal Implications

The societal implications of robot rights are broadly considered, including the potential for such rights to undermine existing systems of accountability. The authors caution against the fetishization of technology through rights claims, which may inadvertently serve the interests of capital by extending protections to robots—essentially, the products of corporate innovation—thus further insulating powerful tech companies from responsibility.

Conclusion

Concluding, the paper emphatically rebuts the arguments for robot rights on metaphysical, ethical, and legal bases, warning against the dangers of such a discourse. It calls for a reorientation of the conversation towards human-centric ethics and accountability in technology development, emphasizing the need to address the harms perpetuated by current AI and robotics against human welfare and environmental sustainability. Rather than abstract debates on robot rights, the focus should be on tangible steps to ensure technology serves to enhance, not undermine, societal justice and equity.

In contemplating the future development of AI, it is paramount that discourse remains anchored in the realities of human experience and the pressing challenges facing our increasingly digitized and automated world. The pursuit of robot rights, however abstract and well-intentioned, diverts attention and resources from these crucial issues, potentially exacerbating existing inequalities and detracting from the urgent need for responsible and equitable technology governance.