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Exploiting CPU Clock Modulation for Covert Communication Channel (2404.05823v1)

Published 8 Apr 2024 in cs.CR

Abstract: Covert channel attacks represent a significant threat to system security, leveraging shared resources to clandestinely transmit information from highly secure systems, thereby violating the system's security policies. These attacks exploit shared resources as communication channels, necessitating resource partitioning and isolation techniques as countermeasures. However, mitigating attacks exploiting modern processors' hardware features to leak information is challenging because successful attacks can conceal the channel's existence. In this paper, we unveil a novel covert channel exploiting the duty cycle modulation feature of modern x86 processors. Specifically, we illustrate how two collaborating processes, a sender and a receiver can manipulate this feature to transmit sensitive information surreptitiously. Our live system implementation demonstrates that this covert channel can achieve a data transfer rate of up to 55.24 bits per second.

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