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Some Characterizations of TTC in Multiple-Object Reallocation Problems (2404.04822v4)

Published 7 Apr 2024 in econ.TH and cs.GT

Abstract: This paper considers reallocation of indivisible objects when agents are endowed with and can consume any bundles. We obtain characterizations of generalized versions of the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) rule on several preference domains. On the lexicographic domain, the TTC rule is uniquely determined by balancedness, Pareto efficiency, the worst endowment lower bound, and either truncation-proofness or drop strategy-proofness. On the more general responsive domain, the TTC rule is the unique individual-good-based rule that satisfies balancedness, individual-good efficiency, truncation-proofness, and either individual rationality or the worst endowment lower bound. On the conditionally lexicographic domain, the augmented TTC rule is characterized by balancedness, Pareto efficiency, the worst endowment lower bound, and drop strategy-proofness. The conditionally lexicographic domain is a maximal domain on which Pareto efficiency coincides with individual-good efficiency. For the housing market introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974), the TTC rule is characterized by Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, and truncation-proofness.

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