Learn to Disguise: Avoid Refusal Responses in LLM's Defense via a Multi-agent Attacker-Disguiser Game (2404.02532v1)

Abstract: With the enhanced performance of large models on natural language processing tasks, potential moral and ethical issues of large models arise. There exist malicious attackers who induce large models to jailbreak and generate information containing illegal, privacy-invasive information through techniques such as prompt engineering. As a result, large models counter malicious attackers' attacks using techniques such as safety alignment. However, the strong defense mechanism of the large model through rejection replies is easily identified by attackers and used to strengthen attackers' capabilities. In this paper, we propose a multi-agent attacker-disguiser game approach to achieve a weak defense mechanism that allows the large model to both safely reply to the attacker and hide the defense intent. First, we construct a multi-agent framework to simulate attack and defense scenarios, playing different roles to be responsible for attack, disguise, safety evaluation, and disguise evaluation tasks. After that, we design attack and disguise game algorithms to optimize the game strategies of the attacker and the disguiser and use the curriculum learning process to strengthen the capabilities of the agents. The experiments verify that the method in this paper is more effective in strengthening the model's ability to disguise the defense intent compared with other methods. Moreover, our approach can adapt any black-box large model to assist the model in defense and does not suffer from model version iterations.