Unraveling Adversarial Examples against Speaker Identification -- Techniques for Attack Detection and Victim Model Classification (2402.19355v1)

Abstract: Adversarial examples have proven to threaten speaker identification systems, and several countermeasures against them have been proposed. In this paper, we propose a method to detect the presence of adversarial examples, i.e., a binary classifier distinguishing between benign and adversarial examples. We build upon and extend previous work on attack type classification by exploring new architectures. Additionally, we introduce a method for identifying the victim model on which the adversarial attack is carried out. To achieve this, we generate a new dataset containing multiple attacks performed against various victim models. We achieve an AUC of 0.982 for attack detection, with no more than a 0.03 drop in performance for unknown attacks. Our attack classification accuracy (excluding benign) reaches 86.48% across eight attack types using our LightResNet34 architecture, while our victim model classification accuracy reaches 72.28% across four victim models.

• The paper introduces a defense framework that achieves a 0.982 AUC for detecting adversarial attacks in speaker identification systems.
• It employs a LightResNet34 architecture to classify eight distinct adversarial attack types with an accuracy of 86.48%.
• It develops a novel dataset that enables victim model identification with 72.28% accuracy across four speaker identification models.

Enhancing the Robustness of Speaker Identification Systems Against Adversarial Attacks

Addressing the Threat of Adversarial Attacks

Adversarial attacks on neural networks, especially in the context of speaker identification systems, pose a significant threat to the reliability and security of these technologies. By exploiting the vulnerabilities inherent in these models, attackers can induce misclassification or erroneous behavior through the injection of imperceptible perturbations into the input data. In response, this paper explores a comprehensive defense framework aimed at detecting and classifying adversarial attacks, as well as identifying the victim models targeted by these attacks.

Key Contributions

The findings of this paper are centered around several significant contributions to the field:

• The development of a binary classifier capable of distinguishing between benign and adversarial samples, achieving an AUC of 0.982, showing minimal performance drop when faced with unknown attacks.
• The exploration of new architectural approaches for attack classification, utilizing a LightResNet34 architecture to achieve an 86.48% accuracy across eight distinct attack types.
• The introduction and utilization of a novel dataset, crafted from various adversarial attacks launched against a selection of victim models, aiding in the classification of victim models with a 72.28% accuracy across four different models.

Technical Insights and Methodologies

This paper's methodological approach entails an intricate analysis of adversarial attacks, focusing predominantly on white-box attacks due to their higher potency and expedited generation process. Concentrating on three prevalent attack methodologies—Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), Projected Gradient Descent (PGD), and Carlini-Wagner (CW) attacks—the paper explores both the detection of adversarial samples and the finer distinctions among attack types and target models.

For attack detection and classification, the paper innovates by comparing different architectural models, namely LightResNet34 and ECAPA-TDNN, presenting an evaluation of their efficacy in classifying the type of adversarial attack. To address the challenge of victim model identification, a novel dataset encompassing a range of attacks against four distinct speaker identification models was developed, enabling the successful classification of attacks tailored to specific victim models.

Implications and Future Directions

The results underscore the feasibility and effectiveness of leveraging advanced architectural models and novel datasets for the detection, classification, and victim model identification of adversarial attacks on speaker identification systems. The robustness showcased in the faced experiments suggests a promising avenue for further research, particularly in broadening the scope to include adaptive and black-box attacks, thereby enhancing defenses against a wider array of adversarial intrusions.

Looking ahead, the paper heralds the potential for continuous improvements in defensive strategies, aiming to expand the inclusivity of attacks and victim models considered. Such advancements could significantly uplift the security and dependability of speaker identification systems, ensuring their resilience against the evolving landscape of adversarial threats.

Acknowledgments

The research acknowledged the support of DARPA RED under contract HR00112090132, highlighting the collaborative effort and institutional backing behind this pivotal paper, set to influence the future trajectory of adversarial defense strategies in speaker identification systems.