VoltSchemer: Use Voltage Noise to Manipulate Your Wireless Charger (2402.11423v1)

Abstract: Wireless charging is becoming an increasingly popular charging solution in portable electronic products for a more convenient and safer charging experience than conventional wired charging. However, our research identified new vulnerabilities in wireless charging systems, making them susceptible to intentional electromagnetic interference. These vulnerabilities facilitate a set of novel attack vectors, enabling adversaries to manipulate the charger and perform a series of attacks. In this paper, we propose VoltSchemer, a set of innovative attacks that grant attackers control over commercial-off-the-shelf wireless chargers merely by modulating the voltage from the power supply. These attacks represent the first of its kind, exploiting voltage noises from the power supply to manipulate wireless chargers without necessitating any malicious modifications to the chargers themselves. The significant threats imposed by VoltSchemer are substantiated by three practical attacks, where a charger can be manipulated to: control voice assistants via inaudible voice commands, damage devices being charged through overcharging or overheating, and bypass Qi-standard specified foreign-object-detection mechanism to damage valuable items exposed to intense magnetic fields. We demonstrate the effectiveness and practicality of the VoltSchemer attacks with successful attacks on 9 top-selling COTS wireless chargers. Furthermore, we discuss the security implications of our findings and suggest possible countermeasures to mitigate potential threats.

• The paper demonstrates that voltage noise can be leveraged to manipulate wireless chargers, enabling voice command injection, overcharging, and FOD bypass.
• Experiments on nine top-selling COTS chargers validate the vulnerability of wireless charging systems to intentional electromagnetic interference.
• The research underlines the need for enhanced Qi standards and security protocols to counteract voltage noise exploitation in wireless chargers.

An Analysis of VoltSchemer: Exploiting Voltage Noise in Wireless Chargers

The paper "VoltSchemer: Use Voltage Noise to Manipulate Your Wireless Charger" explores the vulnerabilities inherent in commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) wireless charging systems due to intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI). The researchers introduce VoltSchemer, a suite of attack vectors that capitalize on these vulnerabilities, enabling adversaries to manipulate wireless chargers through voltage noise without modifying the chargers themselves.

Key Findings and Methodology

VoltSchemer presents the first instance of exploiting voltage noise to gain control over wireless chargers, revealing significant security threats in systems traditionally considered safer than their wired counterparts. The paper outlines three primary attacks possible through VoltSchemer:

1. Voice Assistant Manipulation: By inducing a magnetic field to inject inaudible voice commands, attackers can control voice assistants in devices being charged.
2. Overcharging and Overheating: Voltage noise can deceive chargers to overcharge devices, risking damage through overheating.
3. Foreign Object Detection (FOD) Bypass: The interference can bypass Qi-standard FOD mechanisms, leading to damage of objects due to exposure to intense magnetic fields.

The authors substantiate these claims through rigorous experimentation on nine top-selling COTS wireless chargers. The results affirm the viability of these attacks, thereby highlighting the widespread risk posed by the identified vulnerabilities.

Practical Implications

The practical implications of VoltSchemer are multifaceted. First, the demonstrated ability to perform voice injection could compromise user privacy and security. Manipulating wireless chargers to damage devices or other objects underscores the need for enhanced security protocols in wireless charging standards like Qi.

Furthermore, the vulnerabilities revealed by VoltSchemer extend to various public places, such as hotels and coffee shops, where wireless chargers are ubiquitous. This amplifies the potential impact of these security issues.

Theoretical Considerations

From a theoretical standpoint, VoltSchemer challenges the assumed security characteristics of wireless charging systems by leveraging electromagnetic interference principles. This research contributes to understanding how voltage noise and EMI can disrupt in-band communication channels crucial for the safe operation of wireless chargers.

Understanding these interference impacts allows for insights into improving electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) standards and developing robust countermeasures that can withstand such sophisticated attack vectors.

Future Directions and Countermeasures

Future research could explore more generalized defense mechanisms applicable to a broader range of charging protocols. The application of real-time monitoring or incorporation of advanced noise suppression components could mitigate these risks.

Additionally, enhancing Qi standard specifications to address these vulnerabilities could involve refining existing safety mechanisms or integrating additional layers of security to protect against IEMI threats effectively.

In conclusion, VoltSchemer not only uncovers critical vulnerabilities in wireless charging systems but also prompts a reevaluation of security measures in the rapidly expanding wireless charging market. This research calls for immediate attention and action from both the research community and industries involved in deploying wireless charging technologies.