Does bilevel optimization result in more competitive racing behavior? (2402.09548v2)

Abstract: Two-vehicle racing is natural example of a competitive dynamic game. As with most dynamic games, there are many ways in which the underlying solution concept can be structured, resulting in different equilibrium concepts. The assumed solution concept influences the behaviors of two interacting players in racing. For example, blocking behavior emerges naturally in leader-follower play, but to achieve this in Nash play the costs would have to be chosen specifically to trigger this behavior. In this work, we develop a novel model for competitive two-player vehicle racing, represented as an equilibrium problem, complete with simplified aerodynamic drag and drafting effects, as well as position-dependent collision-avoidance responsibility. We use our model to explore how different solution concepts affect competitiveness. We develop a solution for bilevel optimization problems, enabling a large-scale empirical study comparing bilevel strategies (either as leader or follower), Nash equilibrium strategy and a single-player constant velocity baseline. We find the choice of strategies significantly affects competitive performance and safety.