The Danger Of Arrogance: Welfare Equilibra As A Solution To Stackelberg Self-Play In Non-Coincidental Games (2402.01088v2)

Abstract: The increasing prevalence of multi-agent learning systems in society necessitates understanding how to learn effective and safe policies in general-sum multi-agent environments against a variety of opponents, including self-play. General-sum learning is difficult because of non-stationary opponents and misaligned incentives. Our first main contribution is to show that many recent approaches to general-sum learning can be derived as approximations to Stackelberg strategies, which suggests a framework for developing new multi-agent learning algorithms. We then define non-coincidental games as games in which the Stackelberg strategy profile is not a Nash Equilibrium. This notably includes several canonical matrix games and provides a normative theory for why existing algorithms fail in self-play in such games. We address this problem by introducing Welfare Equilibria (WE) as a generalisation of Stackelberg Strategies, which can recover desirable Nash Equilibria even in non-coincidental games. Finally, we introduce Welfare Function Search (WelFuSe) as a practical approach to finding desirable WE against unknown opponents, which finds more mutually desirable solutions in self-play, while preserving performance against naive learning opponents.