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Changing Simplistic Worldviews (2401.02867v1)
Published 5 Jan 2024 in econ.TH
Abstract: We study a Bayesian persuasion model with two-dimensional states of the world, in which the sender (she) and receiver (he) have heterogeneous prior beliefs and care about different dimensions. The receiver is a naive agent who has a simplistic worldview: he ignores the dependency between the two dimensions of the state. We provide a characterization for the sender's gain from persuasion both when the receiver is naive and when he is rational. We show that the receiver benefits from having a simplistic worldview if and only if it makes him perceive the states in which his interest is aligned with the sender as less likely.
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