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The Value of Mediation in Long Cheap Talk (2312.14793v2)
Published 22 Dec 2023 in cs.GT
Abstract: In this paper, we study an extension of the classic long cheap talk equilibrium introduced by Aumann and Hart~\citeN{aumann-hart-03}, and ask how much can the players benefit from having a trusted mediator compared with the standard unmediated model. We focus on a setting where a fully informed sender without commitment power must disclose its information to influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. We show that, in the case of binary actions, even though a mediator does not help neither the sender nor the receiver directly, it may still allow improving the payoff of an external decision-maker whose utility is affected by the realized state and the receiver's action. Moreover, we show that if there are more than two actions, there exist games in which both the sender and the receiver simultaneously benefit from mediation.
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