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Quick Order Fairness: Implementation and Evaluation (2312.13107v2)

Published 20 Dec 2023 in cs.DC

Abstract: Decentralized finance revolutionizes traditional financial systems by leveraging blockchain technology to reduce trust. However, some vulnerabilities persist, notably front-running by malicious actors who exploit transaction information to gain financial advantage. Consensus with a fair order aims at preventing such attacks, and in particular, the differential order fairness property addresses this problem and connects fair ordering to the validity of consensus. The notion is implemented by the Quick Order-Fair Atomic Broadcast (QOF) protocol (Cachin et al., FC '22). This paper revisits the QOF protocol and describes a modular implementation that uses a generic consensus component. Moreover, an empirical evaluation is performed to compare the performance of QOF to a consensus protocol without fairness. Measurements show that the increased complexity comes at a cost, throughput decreases by at most 5%, and latency increases by roughly 50ms, using an emulated ideal network. This paper contributes to a comprehensive understanding of practical aspects regarding differential order fairness with the QOF protocol and also connects this with similar fairness-imposing protocols like Themis and Pompe.

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